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Abstract 
This paper explores the meaning attributed to the national group as an entry point into how 
boundaries between the in-group and the out-group are formed. To do so, it focuses on the 
representation of the past of the group, taken as a symbolic resource able to produce a raison 
d’être for national groups, and does so within a dialogical framework. Using the transcripts of the 
French parliamentary debates on immigration from 2006, it proposes a qualitative analysis of 
collective narratives of the past along three axes: 1) what meaning do they give to the nation, 2) 
how is such a meaning produced, and 3) how do the stories told by different groups reply or relate 
to one another. By identifying the main narratives found in the data and how they relate to each 
other – within and between groups – it proposes to see collective memory as itself the product of 
symbolisation processes and, therefore, as a cultural tool especially powerful to produce meaning 
about the present. This paper also argues that collective memory is a situated construction 
negotiated with – or contested by – others, made possible by the presence of common historical 
benchmarks to which different meanings may however be attributed. Finally, it proposes to 
understand “immigration talk” as potentially the product of the identity questions faced by the 
national group, rather than the other way around. 
Introduction 
The definition of the nation, who may belong to it and what is the essence of its members, 
has become a central question in the management of immigration in most Western 
countries, especially in Europe. The resurgences of nationalism, the multiplication of bills 
to limit immigration, the apparition of extreme right parties in European parliaments, are 
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all raising the question of how we define national group boundaries and on what ground. 
Much research has been done in the past decades on how groups are defined in opposition 
to an out-group, from Tajfel’s first findings (e.g. Tajfel, 1970, 1978) to Reicher’s model of 
the processes by which the in-group is sacralised and the out-group demonised (Reicher, 
Haslam, & Rath, 2008). Here emerges the image of a “natural” drift of group organisation: 
if we are together, it is against others who are not like us and will never be.  
Far from trying to endorse or oppose such a conception of intergroup relations, this paper 
aims at approaching this issue through a slightly different angle: the question of the 
meaning we attribute to the existence of the groups we belong to – and to the fact that we 
belong to them – and those we do not. Following Dahinden & Zittoun (2013), it proposes 
to explore how meaning is produced for the group, considering it as interrelated with the 
question of its boundaries, as “it is impossible to create a meaning without 
actually creating the boundary between that meaning and what differs from it, and 
reversely” (Dahinden & Zittoun, 2013, p. 202). From this perspective, “in-groups and out-
groups are […] the result of symbolic and social boundary work of actors. Social 
differences – the distinction between “us” and “them”, thus in-groups and out-groups – 
and corresponding boundary processes are historically constructed in specific contexts and 
are variable, hereby involving a broad range of actors” (Holtz, Dahinden, & Wagner, 
2013, p. 234). In the case of nationalism, this implies that the meaning we build around 
“the nation” will produce a symbolic boundary that may be turned into a social one 
(Lamont & Molnár, 2002). It will thus have repercussions on the line we draw between 
who is allowed in the country (and will obtain a visa or work permit) and who is not, as 
well as how outsiders are perceived.  
It is not my aim, then, to define what the nation is, but to consider how the meaning of this 
particular ‘object’ is constructed and negotiated, and the implications it may have in 
people’s life. Indeed, what Dahinden & Zittoun (2013) express about religion can be 
applied to the nation as well, that is that “it is not a natural, substantivist cultural 
difference with regard to religion which is the raison d’être for the existence of religious 
groups, but that subjective mobilisation of such ideas and symbols by actors – in terms 
of meaning making and boundaries – produce the groups in question” (p. 201).  
This also implies, in the case of groups such as nations, that the meanings we produce and 
use do not only determine the limits of the group, but the relevance of the said group in 
organising and explaining the social world for its actors. Indeed, not all memberships 
unleash passions, nor do they take on the same dimensions for all the members of a given 
group. Group memberships, as the groups themselves, are multiple, dynamic, historical 
and contextual (Gillespie, Howarth, & Cornish, 2012). However, it seems that some of 
them “stick”, whether in time (becoming part of history) or for those who hold them 
(becoming part of their identity). Their perspectival nature does not prevent them from 
becoming hegemonic elements of our social environment. In such a context, I believe it is 
worth asking what meaning we attach not only to the delimitations we draw in the social 
field – the “us” against “them” – but to the existence of the group itself. Exploring the 
meaning attributed to the nation to produce its boundaries – and how it may be contested – 
may therefore be a step towards a better understanding of the increasing importance of 
immigration in political discourses.  
To explore such processes, parliamentary debates on immigration can be a good starting 
point. Indeed, they constitute the place where the boundaries of the group are officially 
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discussed, negotiated and defined. If boundaries tend to be at times blurry and are 
perpetually renegotiated in social interactions (Lamont & Molnár, 2002; Pachucki, 
Pendergrass, & Lamont, 2007), then focusing on the moment where symbolic boundaries 
are turned into legal social boundaries through a public debate may shed light on how their 
meanings are constructed. Although parliaments may not be the place where decisions are 
actually taken (Manin, 2008), they remain a solemn public arena, where different positions 
are officially discussed and contested. As such, they constitute a form of ‘political show’ 
(Landowski, 1977), where publicly taken positions may become part of history1. They are 
also the place where public opinion – as an artefact created by the media and supposed to 
represent the spirit of the time on a specific issue (Landowski, 1989) –, as it is represented 
by the members of parliament, is crystallised to produce the rules the group is going to 
live by.  
What is interesting here is the idea that parliamentary debates should be the place where 
the nation is represented in its plurality, no matter whether this is really the case and, for 
those debates on immigration, where the nation discusses the right for outsiders to enter 
the group. The following is therefore an analysis of the meaning given to the national 
group in French parliamentary debates over a bill on “Immigration and Integration” from 
20062. 
It is important to note and explain, from the start, the absence of two elements from this 
paper. First, the notion of power will implicitly appear here and there in the analysis, but it 
will remain a ghostly shadow compared to its importance in intergroup interactions and 
the management of immigration. Far from denying the importance of power in the 
understanding of such situations – or any situation, for that matter – it is here taken for 
granted. Indeed, immigration is a question of power, of how a group may impose barriers 
– material and symbolic – to prevent others from entering its territory and of how
powerful groups may become attractive to outsiders. Democratic politics is often but the
tussle to obtain the power conferred by the adhesion of the nation to the ideas of the party,
power that legitimates the tentative of the group to create a world in its image. And social
representations, with the specific point of view on reality they stand for, position actors in
relation to each other and may grant power and legitimacy to those able to impose their
vision of the world (Jovchelovitch, 2007). As such, every element of discourse analysed
here, every meaning produced, every argument, contestation, silence, etc., is, without a
doubt, also a matter of power. It thus will remain the background against which this study
rests, although one mainly implicitly referred to.
Similarly, racism – and other forms of discrimination – will not be discussed here. How 
political discourses create and sustain racial and religious discrimination has been 
discussed elsewhere (for studies on French parliamentary discourse, see Van Der Valk, 
2003; Van Dijk, 2001), and it will be taken as a given here that parliamentary debates 
have the potential to do so - and in the case of debates on immigration, often do. And that, 
unfortunately, it is commonly what is at stakes with immigration policies. 
1 See for instance the name of the journal in which the official transcripts of the debates are 
published, which is simply called “Journal Officiel”. 	  
2 The data comes from a master dissertation done under Alex Gillespie’s supervision at the London 
School of Economics (de Saint-Laurent, 2012), a dissertation which is used here for background 
information as it presented a preliminary analysis of the data. 
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In this paper, first, I will present the lens that was used to explore meaning-making – 
collective memory as the collective imagination of the past – and attempt to build a 
theoretical framework for its study in group interactions. From this, three questions will be 
defined: 1) what meaning do the stories told about the past produce for the group? 2) how 
is such a meaning produced? and 3) how is such a meaning negotiated with the others 
present in the debate? A method to explore these questions in relation to the data will then 
be proposed, and the results of this analysis presented. Finally, an attempt to draw their 
practical and theoretical consequences for boundary work will be made. 
Collective memory and meaning making 
If “meaning making designates the process by which human beings make the world 
readable, valuable and actionable, through the use of semiotic means” (Dahinden & 
Zittoun, 2013, p. 187), then focusing on the apparition and utilisation of such semiotic 
tools in the discussion of the boundaries of the national group may provide an interesting 
entry point into the way meaning is produced.  
With this idea in mind, what is proposed here is an analysis of the references made to 
history in a specific set of parliamentary debates. Indeed, the way the group represents its 
past and organises it along culturally shared story lines is part of the group’s identity and 
confers meaning to its actions and existence (Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012; Wertsch, 2002, 
2008). What we, collectively, choose to forget, to sacralise or to question is never left to 
chance (Ergur, 2009), and the stories we decide to tell relate what we believe about 
ourselves and the groups to which we belong (Halbwachs, 1950). Such stories may 
therefore play a central role in social identification (e.g. Liu & Hilton, 2005; Liu, Wilson, 
McClure, & Higgins, 1999) and in present group interactions (Delori, 2011). Indeed, “if 
history can subjectively shape social imagination and be reinterpreted depending on the 
present conflicts and needs, it can also provide the temptation to reproduce the patterns of 
the past” (Leveau, 1994, p. 159). The negotiation of the narratives of the past is thus also a 
political issue (Rahman, 2010), where what is said is a reconstruction that may be used to 
shape national identities (Gavriely-Nuri, 2013) or to give meaning to present issues (Lee, 
2014). 
Moreover, as expressed in the definition of meaning-making proposed above, the 
possibility offered by representations of the past to play an important role in identity 
construction is not simply due to the direct justifications of the existence of the group. 
Indeed, as culturally shared symbolic elements, they may constitute symbolic resources. 
That is, they can be used to produce meaning for the ruptures experienced in the present 
(Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson, & Psaltis, 2003; Zittoun, 2006).  
In the case of the nation, transitions between historical periods, where old meanings 
cannot stand anymore, may involve a specific use of the representation of the collective 
past as a symbolic resource, as it may be the case today with the transition from local 
organisation to globalisation. A world where multicultural contacts are in constant 
augmentation, where the existence of the nation may be experienced as threatened by 
others – be it in economic, cultural or territorial terms – potentially leads to the 
renegotiation of the permeability of the group and its raison d’être. As a result, exploring 
the references made to history as possible traces of such movements, participating to the 
rewriting or strengthening of national myths, may constitute a valuable entry point into the 
4
meaning given to the nation and how its boarders are delimited. This paper thus adopts a 
socio-cultural psychological perspective on memory, considering that discourses about the 
past carry with them “a series of momentous suppositions about the world”, and giving it 
meaning (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 10). 
It is worth noting that representations of the past will be grouped under the heading of 
collective memory in what follows. However, collective memory originally referred solely 
to the history of the group as it is remembered by those who lived it (Halbwachs, 1950), 
while the rest of the past of the group falls under the heading of cultural memory or 
collective imagination of the past (Rautenberg, 2010). Many authors have already taken 
the liberty to do so – as it is the case for the vast majority of the studies quoted here – and 
although such a distinction is no doubt of a great interest, it is this general sense of 
collective memory that will be used here. 
Collective memory in interactions 
Part of the interest in data such as parliamentary debates is that it allows us to study 
collective memory in interactions, and therefore to analyse it along with the contestations 
it may lead to. However, it also implies that a framework is needed to take into account 
such a dynamic. In this regard, dialogism can be a good theoretical and methodological 
tool.  
Dialogism as a theoretical tool: intersubjectivity in meaning-making 
As a theoretical orientation, dialogism allows us to understand the multiplicity of 
knowledge and of how culture may be used to build different meanings or types of 
knowledge. Indeed, it stands on “the assumption that human nature and human life are 
constituted in interrelations with ‘the other’, that is, in other orientation” (Linell, 2009, p. 
13). Drawing on the works of Vygotsky, it also considers that every use of tools and signs 
is mediated by others (Vygotsky & Luria, 1994), making the basic unit of analysis a 
triangular relation between self, other and object. As a result, every idea produced 
contains its alternative (Billig, 1987; Gillespie, 2008). If mental life exists in relation to an 
“other”, real or imagined, then ideas emerge at the interplay of sameness and difference 
with the other.  
In the case of collective memory, which may at times seem to reduce discourses to a 
single voice by downplaying “ambiguity and doubt” (Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012, p. 38), 
this means that the stories told about the past have to be understood as part of a larger 
conversation – here again, real or imagined – where what is said can always be contested 
or renegotiated (e.g. Kulyk, 2011; Rosoux, 2001). Indeed, what we say is always a reply to 
someone else, and an anticipation of the reaction of the person to whom the speech is 
addressed (Bakhtin, 1986). Insisting on specific actors’ intentions, historical causalities 
and significance are also meant to indicate the perspectives from which ambiguity, doubt 
and opposing representations are conceived as possible.  
Therefore, collective memory has to be taken as a co-construction between several 
perspectives on historical events. Moreover, if representations always include in some way 
their alternative, it suggests that mobilising the associated meaning also mobilises a 
network of opposed significations, contributing to the dynamic of meaning making 
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processes. Although research on collective memory tends to give a static and unified 
picture of its content in a given population, careful longitudinal analysis shows that the 
accounts people give of the past are dynamic and multiple (Fasulo, 2002; Gavriely-Nuri, 
2013), and thus that it is necessary to take into consideration the context within which 
remembering occurs in order to understand the stories being told (Brockmeier, 2002; 
Fasulo, 2002). 
Dialogism as a methodological tool: identifying traces 
The above theoretical considerations have methodological implications for the study of 
meaning as emerging from intersubjective interactions, and especially for how it can be 
traced in discourse. Indeed, central to dialogical analysis is the idea that the voices of 
others can be found in speech: as words and their meanings are not learned from 
dictionary definitions, every speech act is in a way a quote from someone else (Bakhtin, 
1986).  
Analysing the main voices present can thus help us understand what the speech is a reply 
to, to whom it is addressed and therefore which “larger conversation” it is part of. Because 
of this, voices may also constitute the clearest traces of the social and historical context of 
the utterance (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010). And if meaning emerges in relation to another 
and is dependent on social, cultural and historical context, then analysing these voices may 
be indispensable to understand meanings and their associated processes. 
Moreover, the issue here is that naturally occurring data, such as parliamentary debates, 
only offers traces of phenomena like the use of symbolic resources. It would be foolish to 
expect people to naturally engage in lengthy conversation about the meaning of events 
such as World War II, and even more on how they produced such meanings. To overcome 
this issue, Gillespie’s genealogical method proposes to analyse dialogic overtones, or 
traces of past uses of the utterance, to go “beyond the presentation of recorded data” 
(Gillespie, 2006, p. 156) and “reconstruct the complex social processes through which [the 
discourse] has been forged” (p. 157).  
Here, such a method would allow for the reconstruction of the processes by which 
meaning was attributed to the nation through collective history using relatively fragmented 
data. To do so, Gillespie proposes to search for referenced traces of the object we wish to 
study, symbolic resources or cultural elements that are being brought in to make sense of 
the situation, echoes or implicit traces of voices. And, last but not least, voices, or direct 
quotations.  
Adapting such a framework to the data and the study of the use of symbolic resources, 
several elements were added or modified. First, indirect references to historical events 
were added to direct references, with for instance expression like “the foundational 
principles of the Republic” indirectly referring to its foundation, that is, the French 
Revolution. Second, collective memory being itself a symbolic resource, it is the elements 
in relation to which it was evoked that were coded – that is, the elements that were 
justified or made sense of by using a reference to history. Third, echoes, usually referring 
to unmarked quotations, included references to the words of historical speakers even when 
no quotation was made, such as when an MP said about the parliament: “where Jaurès 
expressed himself”. Here, a voice is evoked, that of the 19th century French politician, 
although his words are not uttered – possibly because they are supposed to be known by 
all. Finally, quotations did not only include quotations of historical speakers, but also 
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evocations of the use by others of references to the past, whether they were indeed made 
or they were supposed. For instance, a Right-winged MP told a Radical Left colleague 
that: “your remarks as those of someone nostalgic for communism, Mister Brard”. Here, it 
is the past use of the symbol of communism that is assumed and interacted with, which fits 
with the aim pursued when identifying voices. 
The data: French parliamentary debates on immigration and integration 
The data used consisted of the official transcripts of fifteen sessions of parliamentary 
debates, which took place in France between May 2nd, 2006 and May 17th 2006, as well 
as the vote session of June 30th, 2006, all made available to the public on the parliament 
official website. This constitutes the whole of the examination of the bill n°2986 on 
“Immigration and Integration” by the National Assembly, one of the two organs of the 
legislative power in France and, here, the first one to officially discuss the bill, for a total 
of one hundred and seven hours of debates.  
Parliamentary days are usually organised in three sessions – morning, afternoon, evening 
– lasting around 4 to 6 hours, and often finish in the middle of the night. For these reasons,
and because an impressive number of bills are discussed every year, only a limited number
of deputies – the members of the National Assembly – participate in the discussion of a
bill (here, around 20, out of 577 deputies).
The transcripts contain the participants’ whole interventions and interruptions from the 
opening to the end of the sessions, as well as general reactions of the Assembly – such as 
laughter or exclamations – which are usually attributed to a whole parliamentary group. 
These groups are central to the Assembly’s structure, as speaking times and turns, seats, 
places in commissions, etc., are allocated to a parliamentary group and not to specific 
members. Furthermore, the allegiance to one’s group is necessary to run for the next 
elections, and therefore taken very seriously by the MPs (Abélès, 2001) 
The Right side of the hemicycle, author of the bill and constituting the majority, was 
represented by one parliamentary group, the Union for Popular Movement, whereas the 
Left was represented by the Socialists (Socialist Party, second group of the parliament) 
and the Radical Left (Communist and Republican Deputies), although both groups 
defended a very similar line. The last parliamentary group was constituted by the 
Centrists3. 
The aim of the bill, proposed by the Right-winged majority, was to drastically reduce the 
number of long-term visas accorded to foreigners through a tightening of the delivery 
conditions for illegal migrants, migrant’s families and those married to EU citizens. 
Although the bill contained several important measures to reach such a goal, the most 
symbolic one – which is also the one that was discussed the longest – consisted in the 
annulation of a law from 1997 which allowed illegal immigrants who could prove that 
they had lived in France for at least ten years to apply for a resident permit. As the 
measure had always concerned a very limited number of people (3,000 a year, in a country 
counting more than 65 million inhabitants), those opposed to the bill saw there a populist 
3 In the interest of clarity, the organisation of the French political groups, the parliaments and the 
French political system as a whole have been simplified here. The original analysis was however 
made without these truncations.
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decision from Sarkozy4 to satisfy his most radical electorate, and its reinstitution was the 
first decision on immigration taken by the Socialist government 5. For the defenders of the 
bill, however, it was considered as a proof that the previous system was encouraging 
illegal immigration. 
The context of the bill was one of great political tension and this law – the second one 
proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy on immigration – polarised the French public sphere and 
became a symbol of the ideas defended by its author during the following campaign for 
the presidential elections (Girier, 2007). As a result, the parliamentary groups were, in the 
debates, mostly organised around the notion of majority (Right) and opposition (Left), 
with the exception of the centrist minority and a couple of Right-winged deputies (de 
Saint-Laurent, 2012). However, the deep clivage between Right and Left – so central to 
the French political life that it shapes “the individual political identifications and the 
processes of politicisation which underlie them” (Haegel, 2005, p. 46, our translation) – 
started much earlier to these debates (Rose & Urwin, 1970). 
Method: reconstructing narratives	  
The analysis of the data took place in three steps. The genealogical method presented 
above was used as a first step to identify the excerpts relevant for the investigation of the 
role of collective memory in giving meaning to the national group; the software used for 
this segment of the analysis was Nvivo. In order to preserve the dynamic nature of 
interactions, the coding included whenever possible also the elements to which 
participants replied as well as the reactions to their reply. 
To define what would constitute historical time without entering in a debate only remotely 
relevant to this study, it was decided to stop at the most recent events among those 
mentioned that would conventionally be considered as part of history in France, namely 
decolonisation. It amounts to 65 intercepts, all of which are rather short (between 15 and 1 
lines, with no more than 3 participants, excluding general reactions from the Assembly) 
except for a lengthy (and heated) conversation on World War II (around 250 lines, with 12 
participants).  
Because of the length of the debates and the evolution of my own sensitivity to indirect 
references, the extraction of the references was done in two times: first through careful 
readings of the whole of the debates, second through a key-words research. The key-words 
were chosen from the 49 excerpts obtained within the first step, and aimed at pinpointing 
indirect references made through expressions clearly linked elsewhere to history. 16 
excerpts were added, mainly referring to the French Revolution and the Enlightenment. 
Unfortunately, several implicit references certainly have eluded me, a pitfall impossible to 
avoid. 
The second step consisted of coding the extracts thereby obtained along two axes. First, 
the events referred to were thematically coded (do they talk about World War II, the 
French Revolution, colonisation, etc.?), trying to map out the historical periods 
represented and regroup similar references. Second, the groups the speakers belonged to 
4 President of France from 2007 to 2012, who made of immigration one of the main topic of his 
2007 electoral campaign.  
5  “Circulaire Valls” dated November 28th, 2012, that actually reduced the necessary presence to 
five years.
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were coded, with two categories: political party and side of the political spectrum. The 
categories proposed here not only follow the groups that seem, as seen above, to be central 
to the representations of the MPs (and are the only ones they evoke for the in-group in the 
debates), but, as will be seen, are also relevant to the analysis. 
For the third step, the concept of “schematic narrative templates” (Wertsch, 2008) was 
used to reconstruct the narratives of the past present in the data. Narrative templates are 
general story lines common to several stories within a given cultural-historical context, 
and they are especially present in collective memory, where national groups tend to use a 
single story line to narrate a multitude of historical events (Wertsch, 2002, 2008). This 
concept was thus used to reconstruct the narratives from the very heterogeneous and 
fragmented excerpts obtained. For this purpose, the different fragments of stories present 
in the data were superposed, with the aim of finding the common general narrative. 
Following the findings presented above on symbolic resources, it was considered that 
elements of the past that are used similarly in discourse probably have a similar meaning 
for their user, facilitating the superposition of elements from different stories.  
Table 1: Example of the use of “schematic narrative templates” to reconstruct the 
narratives underlying the references made to history.  
Historical 
event Main elements of the story 
1. 
References in 
the data Colonisation 
Comparison of 
colonised 
populations with 
today’s immigrants 
Comparison of the 
Right’s policy with 
the one of the 
colonisers 
World War II 
Quotations of 
French “resistants” 
presented as 
defending the same 
ideas as the Left 
Comparison of the 
immigrants to those 
oppressed by 
Nazism 
Comparison of the 
Right’s policy with 
the one of the 
Vichy regime 
2. 
Underlying 
stories 
Colonisation The Left defending…? 
… the populations 
oppressed by 
colonisation… 
… against the 
colonisers 
World War II The resistants… 
… defending the 
victims of World 
War II…? 
… against the 
Vichy regime. 
3. 
Common 
narrative 
templates 
The Left-winged6 
hero… 
… defending 
oppressed people… 
… against the 
defenders of 
oppressive 
ideologies. 
Table 1 offers an illustration of how this reconstruction was made for a limited segment of 
the data. In row 1, the references made to World War II and colonisation by Left-winged 
6 All the resistants quoted were associated later with Left-winged political organisations. 
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deputies are synthesised and then superposed according to how they were used (e.g., the 
Right is compared to both the colonisers and the Vichy regime7, all three being presented 
as classifying men on unfair grounds; it is therefore assumed that the colonisers and the 
partisans of the Vichy regime play the same part within the schematic narrative 
templates). In row 2, the underlying stories are reconstructed (sections not in italic) and in 
row 3 a possible common narrative is proposed. Finally, the missing parts of the stories, in 
italics in the table, are hypothesised from the narrative template. Whenever a story could 
not be reconstructed this way – because the general narratives did not match – the main 
story lines found in the data were still used to shed light on the underlying story, as 
collective memory tends to organise the past along a continuous line (Wertsch, 2002).  
Because of this very reconstructive aspect of the analysis, all the interpretations were 
checked against complementary sources (systematic research in French newspapers for 
references to similar events by politicians, consultation of the different participants’ blogs 
and websites, consultation of some of the history books used in political schools, etc.) and 
involved multiple excerpts and data sources.  
The analysis that follows, carried out on all of the data, presents 1) the stories told by the 
Left, 2) how they were contested by the Right, 3) the stories told by the Right, and 4) the 
contestations they led to from the Left. The interpretation of the meaning these stories give 
to the national group and how it may have been produced is proposed at each step, in 
order to render clearer how such propositions were built. A similar aim underlies the 
ordering of the data, starting each time with the most frequent reference. However, two 
remarks deserve to be made about their initial organisation in the data. First, the references 
to history are spread throughout the debates, although the three sessions that followed the 
opening statements – where public attention tends to diminish – showed a higher 
concentration. Second, the contestations usually happened during the same session – or at 
least the same day – as the original reference, with the evocation of the USSR being the 
only exception.  
The ethnographic and historical elements that were used to interpret the references are 
added along the way. These are based on my experience of the stories surrounding history 
in France, heard in the media, at school, known from popular culture or political 
discourses, and were confronted to those of several French colleagues. They however 
remain subjective, as would any interpretation of such cultural elements8. Because the 
focus of this study is on the dynamic aspect of the use of collective memory, I do not 
believe this to be a major shortcoming: what matters here is the journey, notwithstanding 
the doubts that may surround its starting point. 
7 The Vichy regime governed Southern France during World War II and collaborated with the 
Nazis. This part of French history is however often minimised and the Resistant movement is 
brought to the forefront. 
8 However, as already stated, all the interpretations made here were checked against secondary 
sources.
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Stories and meanings 
The Left: the Revolution, Colonisation, Slavery, Third republic, World War II & 
decolonisation 
The Left’s references to history concern a rather wide array of events, from slavery to the 
Vichy regime during World War II, and go back as far as Leonardo da Vinci and François 
Ier (king of France during the Renaissance). Most of them concern World War II and/or 
colonisation (17 references), and are used to defend the idea that the treatment of 
immigration by the Right resembled the logic of these periods, as one of the aim of the bill 
was to increase the number of qualified immigrants and restrict access to the country for 
unqualified ones. 
Excerpt 19: 
Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): I can very well picture him, filling up his basket on the 
international market […] plundering the developing countries of their life forces! You want to 
plunder them today like the colonial troops did yesterday! 
03.05.2006, first session10 
Excerpt 2: 
Arnaud Montebourg (Socialist): An immigration that you decided to abuse by making resurface 
the shadows of a neo-vichyssoise ideology of sorting men out. 
03.05.2006, third session 
Excerpt 3: 
Jérôme Rivière (Right): I suffer when I receive, at the Strasbourg Court, lessons on the respect 
of Human Rights by judges coming from the Ukrainian, Azeri, Turkish or Georgian systems, to 
quote only a few of the countries [that signed the treaty on the European Court of Human 
Rights]. 
Several Socialist and Radical Left MPs: This is scandalous! 
Bernard Roman (Socialist): Soon with the yellow star! 
Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): This is Gobineau! 
03.05.2006, first session 
Gobineau was a French intellectual from the end of the nineteenth century, considered as 
the father of racial demography and as an important source for Hitler’s ideology, and 
9	  Because of the heterogeneity of the data and its interpretation as a whole, the excerpts presented 
here should not be considered as either representative nor as summarising the data, but as 
illustrations.
10	   All quotes from the debates are designated by author, date and parliamentary session. The 
transcripts do not contain page or paragraph numbers. The political affiliations of the 
participants were added in brackets for clarity, [...] replaces the parts of the interventions that 
were removed. Comments about  the reactions of the assembly, in italics and in brackets, are part 
of the original transcripts. All translations were made by the author. 
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“neo-vichyssoise” refers to the Vichy Regime, Petain’s regime in Southern France which 
collaborated with the Nazis. 
What appears here is the use of the past by the Left – and more specifically the meaning 
attributed to it – to make sense of the present. The proposition of the Right to focalise on 
qualified migrants is interpreted as “colonial plundering”. This differentiation between 
“qualified” and “unqualified” (to which excerpt 2 seems to be a reply, although it is not 
clear in the transcripts) and the one between democratic and undemocratic cultures 
(excerpt 3) is attributed a similar meaning as the one of World War II: the application of 
an ideology – such as Gobineau’s – that differentiates between men on unjustifiable 
grounds.  
The analogies made between different historical periods seems to be made possible by the 
identification by the Left-winged deputies of recurring actors across history: the Right is 
seen as comparable to the colonial troops, because the aim of their actions is represented 
as similar, and similar also to the the Vichy regime, because of its ideology. This is 
especially visible here: 
Excerpt 4: 
Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): Really, two France are in confrontation, as throughout 
History: the one of Coblence11 against the one of the Revolution; the one of Paul Reynaud 
against the one of the Popular Front; the one of Napoleon and Josephine against the one of 
Toussaint Louverture and Victor Schoelcher […] The one that supported Franco, Salazar, 
Mobutu (protestations on the Right’s benches) against the one that defended Grimau, Cunhal, 
Lumumba,… 
Several Right-winged deputies: And Stalin! And Stalin! 
Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): …the France that supported the colonial wars against the 
France in solidarity with the oppressed populations! […] We will fight you with every fibre and 
ounce of strength we have! 
02.05.2013, third session. 
The country is here divided in two sides, the oppressors and those defending the 
oppressed, that are associated throughout history not only because they defended the same 
things, but also because they opposed the same people. This continuity of historical 
characters, allowing for history to go on as an uninterrupted story of social and political 
oppositions, can also be found in the multiple references connecting the World Wars – 
11 All the historical figures evoked here work in opposing couples: 1) Coblence was the city where 
many noble men, accompanied by the king’s brothers, took refuge during the Revolution. 2) 
Reynaud was a French politician known for his economically liberal positions during the social 
movement of the Popular Front. 3) Toussaint Louverture and Victor Schoelcher are important 
figures of the anti-slavery political fight, during the 18th century in the French colonies for the 
former, and in the 19th century metropolitan France for the later. Napoleon I (evoked here with 
his wife Josephine) reinstituted slavery in the French colonies by the end of the 18th century. 4) 
Franco, Salazar and Mobutu, 20th century dictators in Spain, Portugal and the Republic of 
Congo, were opposed to by Grimau (Spanish politician executed during Franco’s dictatorship), 
Cunhal (Portuguese politican, major opponent of the Estado Novo, Salazar’s party) and 
Lumumba (Congolese independence leader, executed shortly after Mobutu’s putsch). 
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especially the second one – and colonisation. The idea defended by the Left when 
referring to both events is that of a debt towards the former French colonies. For instance, 
after arguing against the tightening of the conditions to obtain a visa, a socialist deputy 
said: 
Excerpt 5: 
René Doisière (Socialist): Because, Mister Vanneste, the colonised came in the cold, mud and 
rain to fight and often die so that France could live! 
03.05.2006, second session 
This association of past actors with current ones, of those who died “so that France could 
live” with the current immigrants – condition under which Doisière’s argument can hold – 
is here made possible by a generic “the colonised”. The reference is not to their ancestors 
or their fellowmen – some of which indeed died in the conditions described – but to a term 
encompassing all the population that have been at one point or another victims of 
colonisation.  
It therefore seems that, for the Left, history is a continuous line able to explain the present 
because it is populated by the same characters. These characters perpetually confront each 
other along the same story line: that of oppressed people (the colonised, the Jews, the 
starving farmers of the Revolution, the factory workers of the Popular Front…) confronted 
with the ideologies of their tyrants (the Vichy Regime, the colonial troops, Napoleon, 
Franco…). This aspect of history is presented as forgotten by the Right: the interpellation 
of Vanneste (Right-winged deputy) in excerpt 5, just after he made a discourse, seems to 
be an echo of his words, and for the Left it justified a reminder of the past. 
In this story, the role that the Left aims at filling (already hinted in excerpt 4) can be found 
in the voices they are ventriloquing, through quotations and echoes: the World War II 
resistant René Char as well as Jean Jaurès, one of the most famous Left-wing French 
politicians of the end of the nineteen century. The importance of the words of the latter is 
highlighted in the following excerpt: 
Excerpt 6: 
Jean-Yves Le Bouillonnec (Radical Left): How can you, at the National Assembly tribune… 
Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): Where Jaurès expressed himself! 
Jean-Yves Le Bouillonnec (Radical Left):…evoke the European Human Right Declaration in 
such terms? 
03.05.2006, first session 
Without entering in details, Jaurès was, with Zola, one of the main defenders of Dreyfus in 
the affair of the same name (which led Zola to write his famous “J’accuse”), which 
polarized the French political world between Right and Left at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, and revealed itself to be due to the anti-Semitism of an important part 
of the French population. These events, with the Popular Front, constitute landmarks of 
the Third Republic, a period characterised by an important political instability in France 
but one that also led to the development of the French social model (employees’ 
protection, right to strike, paid holidays, etc.).  
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In this excerpt, the Right is seen by the Left as violating the principles of the National 
Assembly: the Right-winged deputy Jérôme Rivière had just given a speech implying that 
the European Declaration of Human Rights was encouraging unwanted immigration and 
should not be respected in the same way by countries from Western Europe as it was by 
those from Eastern Europe, speech of which excerpt 3 is the conclusion. The reference to 
Jaurès at this moment, and especially to the discourses he made at the exact place the 
members of parliament are nowadays performing theirs, seems to indicate that for the Left 
he is one of the historical figures who gave the institution its sanctity, and therefore the 
former deputy that should be followed. It seems here, quite logically, that the role the 
Left-winged deputies aim at filling is the one of defenders of the oppressed – like Jaurès 
here, and the resistants in the case of World War II – faced with the partisans of the 
oppressing ideology. 
A model of how collective memory is used to produce meaning for the Left seems here to 
emerge, fitting with Wertsch’s perspective on collective memory where a single general 
story line is used to organise the past. Here, what is at stake in the various historical events 
presented is seen as similar to what is at stake in the debates, and the meaning of one event 
is transferred to the others by the identification of similarities between the characters, 
whether in terms of ideologies defended or groups they belong to. This interpretation is 
made all the more plausible by the fact that more than a third of the references to history 
made by the Left concern several historical periods that are evoked as equivalent (such as 
in excerpt 4). Thus, this bill is given the same meaning as these events did: that of a social 
and political struggle between the defenders of the oppressed and those collaborating with 
the oppressors. It is the story of humanists (Jaurès, French resistants, those “in solidarity 
with the oppressed populations”…) defending the victims (colonised, factory workers, 
Jews…) against oppressors. Or, more exactly, those who collaborated with them: it is not 
the colonisers that are present here, but their troops and supporters; the Nazis are never 
directly mentioned, but the Vichy Regime and Gobineau are. Furthermore, all the 
collaborators referred to are French: it is thus the national group that is seen as divided 
along the line humanist/non-humanist, at least since the Revolution, the first event to be 
mentioned by the Left and that fits well into this grand narrative.  
The Right’s contestations: dictators and mere traditions 
Such a representation of history by the Left is, of course, not left uncontested by a Right 
casted out in the role of the internal tyrant, in the same vein as the Nazis, Napoleon and 
Mobutu are. Its contestations take mainly two forms: the delegitimisation of the Radical 
Left MPs through references to the USSR, and of the Socialist through the contestation of 
the importance and meaning of the Popular Front. 
The USSR, either directly referred to or through evocations of Stalin, the Soviet Union, 
the Gulags or the KGB, is the historical period, with the French Revolution, to which the 
Right-winged MPs refer to the most, with 14 spontaneous references. These are only 
addressed to Radical Left deputies, and it therefore is the only historical argument of the 
debates intended for a specific parliamentary group instead of a full side of the 
Assembly’s hemicycle. It also is the only one made from the very first session of the 
debates and attributed to part of a parliamentary group in the transcripts (shouting “And 
Stalin!” in excerpt 4). These comments are mostly made when a Radical Left member 
condemns the positions of the UMP as anti-humanist, although it concerns a rather wide 
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array of topics, and usually take the form of “what about Stalin?”, or are expressed as in 
the following extract: 
Excerpt 7: 
Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): when I fight against your bill, I am faithful to my anti-
colonial tradition. […] 
Christian Vanneste (Right): You are talking about the soviet colonies? 
03.05.2006, first session 
It seems that these references are made to support two arguments. The first one, found in 
the above excerpts, is that the Radical Left is not qualified to make comments about the 
Right's policies, especially in terms of Human Rights, because it supported a dictatorship, 
of which Stalin is the symbol. A second argument can be found in the following extract: 
Excerpt 8: 
Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): Le Pen doesn’t need to have a seat here: he is represented by 
his adepts! 
Christian Vanneste (Right): So is Stalin! 
03.05.2006, first session 
Here, the FN – Extreme Right party of which Le Pen is the leader – and the Radical Left 
are put at the same level by the Right-Winged MP, when numerous declarations of the 
Right had insisted on how necessary it was to make sure that the FN would not reach the 
parliament. The reason invoked by the Right is that the FN is the line on the right not to be 
crossed, notably because it is not a Republican party. The argument appearing here is 
therefore that not only that the Radical Left is not legitimate in its comment, it might not 
be legitimate at the National Assembly either because its underlying ideology runs 
contrary to the Republican principles of the parliament, close as it is to a despotic regime. 
Another line of contestation of the stories told by the Left consists in comments on the 
Popular Front, last major event of the Third Republic – which terminated in World War II 
and of which Jaurès was an MP – and that opposed employers and factory workers over 
the access to social rights. One form of contestation consists in recasting this event as a 
mere tradition: 
Excerpt 9: 
Patrick Braouezec (Radical Left): besides, Sir Minister, I believe that it would be appropriate 
for you to watch some of your words. I completely agree with you when you say that every 
person living on the French territory must accept the values and principles of our Republic. I 
am not, however, when you start evocating the French traditions, which, I believe, foreigners 
do not have to adhere to.  
Claude Goasguen (Right): The Popular Front, it is a tradition! 
04.05.2006, first session 
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As will be seen later, the events central to the history of the country for the Right are 
presented as creators of "principles" for the Republic, and the Right-winged MP's 
comment can therefore be read as an attempt to undermine the importance given to the 
Popular Front by the Left. Moreover, because the Popular Front ended with the access to 
numerous social rights, it is also possible to see here a "reminder" by the Right that such 
rights are a custom, not an obligation. However, some other references to this period shed 
another light on this contestation: 
Excerpt 10: 
René Doisière (Socialist): France has been, ever since the Revolution, considered as the 
country of Human Rights, and it has, except during the period of the Vichy Regime… 
Jérôme Rivière (Right): Which has its origins in the Popular Front! 
René Doisière (Socialist):…been a safe haven for all the persecuted.12 
03.05.2006, second session 
This causal link between World War II and the Popular Front comes from the idea – 
actually defended by the leader of the Vichy regime himself (Milza & Bernstein, 1987) – 
that the Third Republic ended in great political instability and with a country weakened by 
years of social protests, and therefore left France unable to defend itself at the beginning 
of World War II. The argument here seems to be double. First, as it is implied in the 
excerpt, if the Vichy Regime – associated to the Right in several occasions, such as in 
excerpt 2 – has existed in the first place, it is because the Left had left the country drained. 
The second argument, lurking behind the first one, is that the Left’s insistence in pursuing 
what is but a mere social tradition did already cost the country a humiliating defeat and an 
anti-Semitic authoritarian regime. Pursuing the same aims today would be naive as it 
could lead to a similar situation. If the Right delegitimises the radical-Left through 
references to the USSR, doubting that it should even be present in the parliament, here it 
delegitimises the principles of the Left at large, through the contestation of the event that 
for the Left led to the implementation of its values.  
The Right's Republican Pact 
These two forms of contestation, both leading to the delegitimisation of the Left-winged 
participants, go alongside the defence of a competing narrative by the Right. However, 
their references to the past, although concerning a much reduced array of events, are 
significantly less explicit and much more varied in their content than those of the Left. 
The following is therefore an attempt to reconstruct the general narrative, and special 
attention was dedicated to making these interpretations as congruent as possible with the 
rest of the debate and the additional data collected on the participants. Because of the 
heterogeneity of the data, and to keep this section to a reasonable length, only part of it 
presented here. 
The main reference to history made by Right-wing MPs, besides the USSR, concerns the 
French Revolution (14 spontaneous references), although it is often done indirectly 
12  « Un lieu d’asile”, literally: “a place of asylum”, expression that thus has more direct links with 
immigration than “safe haven”, although it is the closest translation. 
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through two main topics. First, Right-winged MPs refer to or quote Rousseau on 
numerous occasions, the ideas of the Enlightenment philosopher being often considered – 
with Voltaire’s – as the roots of the French Revolution13. The first reference to him is 
made on the afternoon of the first day of the debates, and is therefore one of the first 
references made to history in the debates: 
Excerpt 11: 
Alain Marsaud (Right): […] Thus it is not the world offering itself to France, but France 
offering itself to the world as long as it has the capacity to do so. 
This conception, noble and imminently rousseauist, is however very naïve: its only short-term 
consequence will be a race to the bottom for our social organisation.  
02.05.2006, third session 
At the same time, this is the only reference to the philosopher that is a critique of his ideas, 
most of the others resembling the following one: 
Excerpt 12: 
Christian Vanneste (Right): You say that immigration is a fact. But a fact does not make a 
right. 
Jérôme Rivière (Right): Very good! 
Christian Vanneste: And you know who said that? Jean-Jacques Rousseau! 
Thierry Mariani (Right): Very good! 
04.05.2006, first session 
The main idea kept from Rousseau by the Right is that of a civil pact, already hinted at in 
excerpt 12, and in the following raised to the rank of a “common sense principle”: 
Excerpt 13: 
Richard Mallié (Right): There is no need to go back as far as Rousseau’s civil pact to 
understand that living together comes with rights, but also duties. This common sense principle 
is all the more true when it concerns the foreign nationals that we welcome. 
04.05.2006, first session 
Except in the first reference, Right-wing deputies present themselves as in line with 
Rousseau’s ideas. The original opposition to Rousseau, presented in excerpt 11 and 
commonly found with Right-winged MPs (Julliard, 2012), and the shift towards this 
second position – that remained the one taken throughout the debates – may be explained 
by the fact that this argument could be seen as all the more convincing by the Right-
winged MPs as it uses ideas usually associated with the Left  (Julliard, 2012). However, it 
13 Idea that can be found in the official high-school programs in history and philosophy, for 
instance. 
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may also be a form of contestation of the stories told by Left: it insists on how similar 
their ideologies are, whereas the Left presents them as profoundly different. And it is a 
sign that collective memory is indeed constructed in the situation – and thus evolves with 
the interactions that are taking place – although this is the only clear trace found. 
Another set of references from the Right is linked, indirectly, to the French Revolution, 
and specifies the grounds for this pact: it consists of quotations from the Declarations of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen made in reference to the “foundational principles of 
the Republic”. The later expression is linked – at least on the French Republic official 
website vie publique14– to the maxim “liberty, equality, fraternity”, and both are important 
products of the French Revolution. The idea defended here by the Right-winged MPs is 
that the bill needs to respect those principles, and only those, and that it does (see for 
instance excerpt 3). Human rights are evoked frequently in the debates, but only the Right 
refers to “the Rights of Man and of the Citizen”, a direct product of the French revolution, 
while the Left always refers to its “Universal” or “European” versions. Such a difference 
in point of view is best illustrated in the following extract. It is a reply to the Right-winged 
MP Christian Vanneste, who defended the idea of establishing a contract with newly 
arrived immigrants that includes their obligation to respect and follow “the French 
principles”. 
Excerpt 14: 
Patrick Braouezec (Radical Left): When Mister Vanneste affirms that the French law needs to 
be obeyed, nobody is saying the contrary, but let’s not ask more from foreigners, not matter 
what their situation is, than from the French. 
Serge Blisko (Socialist): Equality! 
Christian Vanneste (Right): The Rights of the Citizen are not just the Human Rights! 
Patrick Braouezec (Radical Left): To obey to the Republican principles, nobody in this 
hemicycle would think of questioning this principle. However, obeying “French principles”, I 
admit that I don’t know what this mean. I know universal values, but I don’t know French 
values. I know some Republican principles, I know the French law, but I don’t see why France 
would have specific values. 
Jacques Myard (Right): French specificity does not exist? 
04.05.2006, first session 
The first reply by a Right-winged MP, Christian Vanneste, makes a distinction between 
two kinds of rights: the Human Rights, which concern everyone, and the Rights of the 
Citizen, which concern only the French population. This remark seems to advocate that 
foreigners do indeed have more duties and fewer rights than the French population, being 
a reply to an MP arguing the contrary. The second intervention, by Jacques Myard, shed 
light on why it is believed to be so: France is a singular country. The Right-winged 
deputies thus resist the reduction of the rights of the French population to the Human 
Rights and of the French values to that of the rest of the world. 
A story of the “French specificity” can be drawn from this: what made France is a pact 
that followed the Revolution. It is the central event in the history of the country – the only 
14  www.vie-publique.fr 
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national event lengthily referred to – whose associated political ideology, seen as its 
origin, refers to a ‘civil pact’. The opposition between universal rights and those specific 
to the French can be read as a necessary condition for the existence of the group: in 
excerpt 11, for instance, the opposite is presented endangering social organisation; in 
excerpt 14, the Rights of the Citizen as a protection from foreign values; and in excerpt 3, 
its European counterpart – more universalist – as an obstacle. Then, the Right-winged 
MPs may consider this pact as built to protect the interests of the group, and therefore that 
its principles do not concern outsiders. A Right-winged MP, for instance, presented this 
bill as necessary to stop “desperate populations” from massively migrating to France, 
point immediately followed by “it respects the French history, its traditions, and it defends 
its foundational principles” (Guy Teissier, Right, 05.05.2006, third session). And for 
outsiders to be accepted into the group, the original pact needs to be reiterated: the bill 
they defend proposes a contract with immigrants (excerpt 14), which aims at insuring that 
the duties coming with the pact are respected (excerpt 13).  
Two other specifications of this pact are worth noting. First, the group seems to be seen as 
an indivisible and sovereign whole, idea that stems from the French Revolution as well 
(Debbasch, 1988). This appears in the last event mentioned by the Right, World War II, 
evoked through the symbol of the “yellow star”. Julien Dray, a socialist MP, had just 
countered a Right-winged MP by telling him to go back to the circumscription where he 
was elected. It was taken as major insult, and the Right’s reply triggered a lengthy and 
heated argument: 
Excerpt 15: 
Claude Goasguen (Right): I would like to remind my colleague that, in this Chamber, there is 
no deputy of Levallois, Saint-Denis or the 16th arrondissement (“Yes, there is” on the benches 
of the Socialists and Radical Left). Here are only representatives of the national sovereignty. 
Therefore, you do not have to assign yellow stars to one or another! (Exclamations on the 
Socialists’ benches.) 
05.05.2006, second session 
It seems that what was undermined by Dray’s comment is the idea of the country as an 
indivisible whole represented by the MPs, idea profoundly insulting for the Right-winged 
MPs (the session was suspended twice and six points of orders were raised in relation to 
this incident), possibly because this wholeness is linked to the question of national 
sovereignty. This interpretation seems to fit with the reference to the “yellow star”, 
reminder of the last period during which France lost its sovereignty on its territory, and 
during which it was split in two parts: World War II.  
Second, it seems that what does not directly follow from the Revolution is either 
considered as a mere tradition (see excerpt 9 with the Popular Front), or as being 
irrelevant to the definition of the nation: 
19
Excerpt 16: 
Arnaud Montebourg (Socialist): A third of the French population has an ancestor, a grand-
father or a grand-mother, a foreign parent, and the French Republic always worked this way: as 
a mix! 
Jérôme Rivière (Right): So did the monarchy! 
02.05.2006, third session 
Here, the argument of the French cultural “mix” is countered on the grounds that if it was 
also true of the monarchy, it is not a specificity of the Republic and thus no a valid 
argument to defend immigration.  
The French Revolution is interpreted as the “founding act” of the nation: it is the 
establishment of the Republican Pact, a meaning produced with the use of the French 
Enlightenment philosophers. It organises how other historical events are interpreted and 
attributed meaning in turn: the Popular Front becomes a mere tradition, the USSR the 
proof of the lack of republicanism of the Radical Left MPs, and colonisation is attributed 
“positive aspects” (Christian Vanneste, Right, 10.05.2006, second session) because it does 
not fall outside of the rules of the nation: to protect its members, first and foremost. 
Conversely to the Left, then, the Right does not use a single narrative repeated over 
multiple events, but a ‘grand narrative’ from which all the others are derived.  
The Left's contestation: the universality of Human Rights 
This story line is rarely contested by the Left directly, except in the case of Rousseau, 
where it led to a few reactions, all presenting his ideas as misunderstood by the Right: 
Excerpt 17: 
Serge Blisko (Socialist): I find you a little bit rigid and hard for a Rousseauist, Mister Vanneste. 
Christian Vanneste (Right): Reread Rousseau, you will see that he was far more rigid than I am. 
[…] He defended the death penalty, do not forget about that! 
04.05.2006, first session 
However, indirect contestations can be found. Indeed, where the Right refers to the 
Declaration of the Right of Man and of the Citizen, product of the French Revolution, the 
Left refers exclusively to Human Rights in general or to the European Declaration of 
Human Rights in particular – except when quoting the Right – as can be seen for instance 
in excerpt 6. With the insistence of the Right on the importance of the specificity of 
‘French values’, it can be seen as a tentative contestation by the Left, on the ground that 
Human Rights are universal (see for instance excerpt 14). It seems that although the Left 
also considers the French Revolution as a central event in French history – see for instance 
excerpt 10 where it is implicitly presented as the beginning of democracy – the meaning 
attributed to this event is rather different for these groups. For the Right, it is a founding 
act that lay the rules for the future, whereas for the Left it is where the fight for democracy 
started (see Julliard, 2012 for a similar interpretation). It is the first event evoked by Brard, 
Radical Left member, in his litany of social or political struggles (excerpt 4), but it is 
certainly not over: the Popular Front, the World Wars, decolonisation, and now this bill, 
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followed. Similarly, none of them seem to deny the importance of Rousseau’s philosophy, 
nonetheless they argue about what his words actually meant. Where the Right’s 
contestations included a tentative to unify the Socialist and their ideology under the banner 
of the Enlightenment, the Left here insists on what makes them different, and considers 
that if the Right-winged MPs think otherwise, it is because they misunderstood their ideas, 
whether it is Rousseau or how Human Rights are universal. The importance for the Left 
not to see its ideas reduced to that of the Right is well highlighted in this reply of Radical 
Left member to a Right-winged MP: 
Excerpt 18: 
Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): “I would rather be hanged than agree with you” 
06.05.2013, first session 
Epilogue 
The bill discussed in the debates analysed here was adopted on the 24th of July 2006, with 
very little modifications, and was followed by further restrictions on immigration in July 
and November of the same year. In May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy created the ministry of 
“immigration and national identity”. In reaction, 8 out of the 12 historians of the soon to 
be “National City of the History of Immigration” immediately resigned. In their official 
statement, they accused the state of trying to define the identity of its members, adding 
that this new ministry “is in line with a discourse that stigmatise immigration. The aim of 
the National City for the History of Immigration was to bring people together and 
orientated towards the future, around a common history that everyone could have made 
his” (our translation). This rapprochement between the management of immigration and 
the question of the national identity made them consider their mission impossible. 
Discussion 
It is now possible to return to our three original questions: 1) what meaning do the stories 
told about the past produce for the group? 2) how is such a meaning produced? and 3) how 
is such a meaning negotiated with the others present in the debate? Because the two first 
questions are extremely interrelated, they will be treated together.  
Meanings in construction 
It appears that some of the stories told about the past are indeed used to produce meaning 
about the nation, as well as about other historical events.  
For the Left, the numerous fights for the Human Rights that took place in the history of 
the country give to its existence the sense of an on-going struggle for the implementation 
of a humanistic ideology, perpetually endangered by the ideologies of oppressive others, 
of which the Right is a representative. What matters about the past are the various actors’ 
intentions – oppressing, defending ... – and how they made the different groups relate to 
each other.  
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For the Right, the past, read as the establishment of an exclusive contract between equal 
citizens, makes of the nation a place where civic life can go on, on the basis of a mutual 
agreement, one that only its members are legitimate to negotiate. Here, the past is used to 
define a starting point where the rules have been laid down and that gives legitimacy to 
the group’s existence. Stepping out of such rules would imply creating “something else”, 
something that would not be the French nation anymore.  
This transfer of meaning from past to present seems to be done, in the case of the Left, by 
analogies, where the meaning of one event is transferred to another one because they are 
seen as similar. It allows the organisation of multiple events along a single line, shown by 
the rather wide array of historical periods they refer too, thus offering a sense of 
continuity. For the Right, a historical event is turned into a founding act, creating a form 
of ‘grand meaning’ that organises how other events are going to be understood. It permits 
the production of several different meanings for the past – from a threat to national 
sovereignty with WWII to the ‘battle’ for Republicanism with the Cold War – that follow 
from a single original meaning: the Revolution as the signing of a Republican pact.  
And it appears here that collective memory is not simply potentially a symbolic resource, 
but may also be considered as the product of such a meaning-making process itself. Using, 
as done in these parliamentary debates, one historical event to give meaning to others – 
whether it is because they are seen as being fundamentally similar or because one gave 
rise to the others – is indeed a way to use cultural elements to make sense of the past. 
Then, it is not only the present that is given meaning through the use of collective 
memory, but the past itself is given a sense of continuity and a specific meaning (see 
Favero, 2010, for an illustration of a similar process).  
If symbolic resources allow participants to link past and present, to organise experiences 
along a meaningful line (Zittoun & Grossen, 2013), then the fact that collective memory 
already is the result of the use of other cultural elements to make sense of a disrupted past 
is not at all that surprising. And this makes of collective memory an especially interesting 
symbolic resource in producing meaning, for this entails that it can itself be renegotiated 
in the process.  
Moreover, organising the past along a meaningful line is one of the functions of narratives 
(Bruner, 2003). One of their characteristics, pointed out by Aristotle (quoted in Bruner, 
2003), is that they are always based on the structure ‘familiar-rupture of the familiar by a 
peripetia’ or there would not be a story (a peripetia being an incident or turning point 
usually taking place in a dramatic story). Then, if symbolic resources are cultural elements 
used to make sense of ruptures, and if stories are themselves about such ruptures and how 
life-like characters reacted to them, they are especially fitted for such a role. It may thus be 
because stories are themselves the product of a symbolisation of the unexpected that they 
can in turn help us to produce meaning around present ruptures (see Zittoun, Cornish, 
Gillespie, & Aveling, 2008 for an illustration of a similar case).  
The stories told here are indeed about ruptures: with the monarchy, with the ideologies 
previously defended, with an “other” that threatens the life of the group or its ideology, 
etc. Therefore, it is possible to see collective memory as a construction in a specific 
situation that aims at giving meaning (Bartlett, 1995) by inscribing it into an on-going 
chain of events that would go beyond the experienced rupture (de Saint-Laurent, 2014). 
The way meaning is produced may also change how collective memory is used as a 
symbolic resource, by attributing a different “momentum” to the flow of historical time. 
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Indeed, using analogies seems to provide meaning for a rather wide range of events. 
However, it does not open up new possibilities for the future, as it is the eternal replay of 
the same story. As for the use of a ‘grand meaning’, it seems on the contrary to allow the 
production of a range of meanings, provided that they fit with the original one. However, 
it excludes elements that do not seem to fit with the general story line.  
Negotiation of meanings 
Although each side of the political spectrum seems to organise the past around its own 
specific narrative, the groups also seem to reply to each other through a series of 
oppositions. To a founding act (Right) is opposed the idea of a fight that seems to never 
end (Left); to a unifying contract (Right), incompatible ideologies (Left); to French 
specificities (Right), universal values (Left)…  
The stories they tell may call for such oppositions. In the case of the Right the other’s 
views, perspectives, and voices are considered as either similar to the ones of the rest of 
the group or illegitimate, limiting recognition to similarity and leaving no space for the 
expression of the other’s singularity. As for the Left, the dichotomy operated does not go 
without a judgment on the validity of the other’s knowledge: what differentiate the 
opposed sides of the conflict is here judged in terms of respect for desirable values, as 
expressed in the various Human Rights Declarations. For the other, the only options are 
either to agree, or to be cast out as the “bad guy” in the conflict.  
What we have here are also two types of discourses that may reinforce each other: one 
may react to the tentative to turn the debate into a monologue, such as the Right does, by 
insisting on what make them profoundly different, which seems indeed to be the reply of 
the Left. And the other may try to demonstrate that they believe in the same things – and 
therefore think similarly, such as what is done by the Right through references to 
Rousseau – as a way to refuse to be considered as the “villain” of the story, position in 
which the Left is casting out its opponents.  
Such an opposition can also be understood through the different aims pursued by the 
majority and opposition in parliamentary debates. Indeed, we do not remember by reading 
fixed traces of the past, but by reconstructing what was perceived along more or less 
socially shared story lines and in order to serve a specific interest (Bartlett, 1995).  
For the Right, representing the majority at the time, the aim seems be to persuade the other 
of the validity of its position, which is after all often the purpose of a debate, 
parliamentary or not. The evolution of the Right’s position on Rousseau, for instance, 
seems to fit with this objective: from a characterisation of Rousseau’s ideas as naïve and 
endangering social order, the Right moves to argue that its bill follows the ideology of the 
Left’s favourite philosopher.  
For the Left the situation is rather different: it represents the opposition, and the 
overwhelming majority of Right-winged MPs in the parliament very attached to this bill 
makes persuasion a quite unrealistic aim. The objective that the Left seems to pursue is in 
line with its official name in the parliament: the opposition. Indeed, in the stories they tell, 
the Republican pact and the Revolution are quite left out, and an important number of 
events are highlighted instead. However, in many other circumstances, the “foundational 
principles” of the Republic were made central by Left-winged politicians. For instance, 
the socialist Education Minister and former member of parliament, Vincent Peillon, 
proposed shortly after taking his function the creation of “moral and civic teaching” 
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classes in every high school where the same principles would be taught15. Where in other 
circumstances both sides could agree on the importance of these principles16, in the 
debates the Left oppose them by insisting on other principles and other events. 
Senses and significations 
In spite of the profound oppositions between the two main parliamentary groups, common 
symbols exist, making communication possible between them. Indeed, the emergence of 
signs and meaning in the triangular relation self-other-object allows for a distinction to be 
drawn between what they mean for the person and what is assumed to be common in 
relation to the other. That is, between the socially shared meaning of a sign (signification), 
and a personal one taken when it is associated with experience and given an emotional 
tonality (sense) (Abbey & Zittoun, 2010).  
Here, the different groups share common signs – the ‘yellow star’ as a symbol of 
discrimination, the French Revolution as the creation of modern France, etc. – that enable 
communication by ensuring the existence of a common ground. However, the sense given 
to them may widely differ. For instance, the Revolution may be presented by both sides as 
the act that founded the French Republic, but the particular sense given by the Right is that 
of a contract making life in common possible. As for the Left, it is the beginning of a 
‘humanist fight’, which has yet to be won.   
If “by establishing some shared semiotic systems, group of people can also agree on 
certain interpretations of the world and then generalise them into values or full 
Weltanschaugen which then ground the organisation of the civil society” (Zittoun & 
Dahinden, 2013, p. 187-188), this discrepancy between the meanings given the nation 
goes hand in hand with a different vision of the world and of the future of the group. 
However, the common sign may give the MPs the impression that this is not the case, and 
it gives a place where to ground their oppositions.  
This opposition may also be a product of the French political organisation. The cleavage 
between Right and Left, accentuated by an electoral system privileging bipartism (Rose & 
Urwin, 1970), rests on this paradox: to be on a “side” implies the existence of another 
side, which at the same time belongs to a unique “whole”. The parliament then becomes 
more than an “electoral show”, and is also the place where differences can be re-enacted to 
justify the existence of such an opposition.  
In this game of “who am I”, where each side is defined as much by what its members say 
than by what it refutes in the other, it is the object of the discourse that tends to disappear. 
Occupied as they are in defining who they are, what the nation is and is not, what defines 
their political ideas, one character, which yet should be central to the debates, is 
surprisingly mute. In spite of how often MPs infer the mental states of immigrants – to ask 
whether they want to “integrate” themselves to French society or not, mainly – they are at 
15 Proposition made in September 2012, with a first application in September 2013 (see Le Monde, 
dated 09.09.2013 “Vincent Peillon présente sa “charte de la laïcité““). 
16 A research in the French newspapers « Le Monde » (centre left) and « Le Figaro » (centre right) 
for the period between the 1st of January 2013 and the 1st of September 2013 showed that it had 
been defended by both Left-winged and Right-winged politicians, but that it concerned the latter 
more than 70% of the time. 
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most referred to as victims to be protected, not as agents of their own, and often as a 
foreign body to be excluded from the national group. 
Meanings and boundaries 
These meanings produced around the nation in these parliamentary debates may have 
significant implications for the boundaries of the group. Defining the group as united by a 
republican pact signed several hundred years ago, that ensures that a set of values is 
respected by all, allows limiting the access to the group to those who accept the pact and 
its values. It presents ‘being French’ as the access to specific rights, and makes of the 
inclusion into the national group an honour that implies respecting the duties defined by 
the original group.  
On the contrary, defining the group as the place where a constant struggle between 
defenders of the oppressed and collaborators of the oppressors takes place renders another 
boundary more salient: the one between humanists and non-humanists. Not only the nation 
cannot be reduced to the desired group – for some of its historical members would then be 
left out – but this new group includes members far outside the national group. In that case, 
the nation is not a relevant group to organise the social world.  
These divergent visions also produce different separations in the National Assembly: 
between Right and Left and between Republican parties and the ‘extremes’. And it is 
indeed the two separations that can be found in the discourses of politicians and the 
political media in France. Thus, it is not only the boundaries of the group that are 
negotiated here, but the very possibility to impose some inside the national group. 
The stories told and the meaning they produce also seem to attribute legitimacy to the 
various groups. Where the Right recognises the place of the Socialists in the “national 
representation”, the various “extremists” have no right to speak. For the Left, the Right 
seems to be legitimate only as an adversary of its ideologies.  
However, perhaps more interesting are the groups whose voices are not delegitimised – 
which implies considering the possibility of the alternative – but who remain silent in the 
stories of the MPs. The immigrants are notably silent in these stories, if not completely 
absent. Even in the case of the Left, where they are presented as a group to be protected, 
they do not appear as full characters, but as the object over which the ‘heroes’ and the 
‘villains’ fight. The Right and the Left discourses about immigration may often be deeply 
opposed, but paternalism and discrimination are two faces of the same token that 
essentialises differences (Costa-Lascoux, 2001, p. 129). 
Conclusion 
This paper has aimed to analyse the meaning given to the nation as a producer of specific 
boundaries. It focused on collective memory, as it provides justification of the group’s 
existence and identity for its members. This has led me to argue that the meaning given to 
the group may not only determine where its boundaries are placed and how permeable 
they are, but how relevant they may be for its members. Here, the stories told by the Left 
renders the national group relatively irrelevant in explaining the social world – because no 
relevant characteristics unify its members. On the other hand, the stories told by the Right 
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make the national group relevant because it defines its members as holding certain 
common values that are necessary to the common good of the group.  
In the multiplicity of the memberships displayed here – parliamentary group, side of the 
political spectrum, national institution, country… – it seems that the meaning given to the 
groups may determine how important they are in organising the world of those who hold 
them. If for the Right the nation allowed the existence of all the other groups, for the Left 
it made the political oppositions more salient than the nation.  
Although boundary work is often understood as a perpetual renegotiation between 
dominant and dominated groups (Lamont & Molnár, 2002), this study highlights how, 
even within the majority, opposing discourses around the meaning of the group foster the 
reinforcement of boundaries, their mobility, call them into question, delegitimise actors, 
etc. It also points to the fact that, beyond the question of the meaning of the nation, also 
lurks the question of how we represent culture. In one case, it is represented as a unified 
group where each member holds a set of value similar to those of the rest of his group and, 
in the other, as people in contact with a common set of values and who choose between 
them, positions commonly found even psychological studies of culture (Valsiner, 2007, p. 
10). 
This paper also argued that the ruptures experienced in the past of the group are given a 
meaning through their narration, and that such a meaning seems to be applied to the 
present crisis. Identifying the events of the past that are represented as bifurcation points, 
and opening a dialogue to render explicit the meaning given to them, can therefore be a 
step forwards towards the imagination of a collective future.  
However, the existence of common benchmarks is necessary for such a dialogue to take 
place. In the specific case of immigration, the relative lack of symbolisation of one of its 
last turning points may be where lies the rub: decolonisation is only indirectly evoked in 
the debates and, in spite of a growing interest for the remembrance of the independence 
wars, it often leads, in official discourses (e.g. Lang, 2001), to a certain paralysis 
(Blanchard & Veyrat-Masson, 2008).  
But retribution and the recognition of past crimes are not all that is at stakes in the 
construction of a common narrative of colonisation and decolonisation between the French 
population and the immigrants from its former colonies. To invent a common future, in a 
multicultural society marred neither with discrimination nor with paternalism, may require 
writing a common past, and producing a meaningful narrative. 
Finally, and although the analysis proposed here does not allow us to generalise these 
conclusions to the problem of immigration in Europe or to the increase of “immigration 
talk”, it does point towards an interesting possibility.  
Indeed, the importance of immigration in political discourses, at least in France, cannot be 
explained by an increasing number of foreigners migrating to the country. For the period 
evoked the most in the debates, from 1998 to 2006, the absolute number of immigrants 
may have increased, but the proportion of immigrants out of the total population living in 
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France did not change17. And what appears in the data is not a strong focus on the 
immigrants themselves, or how they may threaten the country, but on what it means to be 
French, and the place of the country in the world – expressed through the question of its 
specificity.  
If one cannot deny that parts of the population may indeed feel a stronger presence of 
immigrants in their countries, the question arises of whether immigration prompts the 
debate over identity in societies becoming increasingly multicultural or, on the contrary, 
whether national identity becomes at times problematic enough for groups to perceive 
outsiders as a threat because they reactivate this unresolved issue?  
As stated at the beginning of this paper, nations are not “natural” categories, but products 
of histories, discourses and practices embedded in specific socio-cultural contexts. One 
may then wonder if the current transformations in the global order, whose origins can be 
found in globalisation, the financial crisis or the ecological challenges that await us, are 
not forcing us to rethink the place of our countries in the world. And therefore, for us to 
wonder, once more, who we are. 
17 And in some categories only. In others, a reduction can even be observed. See for instance the 
3rd governmental report on the “General orientation of the immigration policies”  (Secrétariat 
général du comité interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration, 2007).	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